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Paul Johnston 
in the campaign, in particular by the famous 
Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel. A much quoted 
12 June 1944 message from Rommel to Berlin 
reads: 
Our own operations are rendered extraordinarily 
difficult and in part impossible to carry out 
[owing to] the exceptionally strong and, in some 
respects overwhelming, superiority of the enemy 
air force.2 
...And Some Army Accusations 
It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical, therefore, that there is another theme running through 
commentary on the Battle of Normandy, and that 
is criticism of air support. Many critics have 
complained - some vociferously if not viciously 
- that the RAF3 was intransigent, uncooperative 
and sometimes downright stinting in its provision 
of air support to the land campaign. 
Only a year after the war, Major-General C.C. 
Mann, who as a brigadier had been the Chief of 
Staff at First Canadian Army headquarters 
throughout the Northwest Europe campaign, 
made a s t r ik ing and surpr is ingly b l u n t 
accusation. He described the basis of the British 
and Commonwealth doctrine for air support as 
"unsound."4 
Mann strongly believed that RAF air support 
had been stinting and unresponsive during the 
campaign in Northwest Europe. And this was not 
just his opinion upon reflection after the fact. In 
the midst of some of the worst fighting of the 
Normandy campaign, he had felt strongly enough 
The history of tactical air power in the battle of Normandy has been fraught with both 
misunderstanding and contradiction. Largely 
ignored by the army-centric historians who have 
written the histories of the campaign, it has been 
asserted on the one hand that Allied air power 
was overwhelming and on the other that the 
system for controlling it was cumbersome and 
ineffective. On the face of it, at least, there would 
appear to be some tension between those two 
schools of thought. Which is more accurate? In 
order to examine that question, it is important 
to begin with an understanding of the doctrine 
for tactical air power - the contemporary doctrine 
of the time - and disputes about both that 
doctrine and the role of air power in the 
campaign. What emerges is that there is enough 
blame to go around for all parties - and enough 
credit. In truth, the doctrine of the time was 
under-developed, and this simply reflected some 
of the larger doctrinal weaknesses of the Western 
Allies' militaries. 
One Traditional View... 
One of the more famous paintings of the Second World War is Rocket Firing 
Typhoons over the Falaise Gap, Normandy 1944 
by Frank Wootton. It captures a traditional image 
of Allied air power over the Normandy battlefield 
- crushing air supremacy that doomed the 
Germans. Chester Wilmot made this point early 
in his classic history of the war, The Struggle/or 
Europe: "The value of this air supremacy can 
hardly be overrated."1 He is seconded in this 
opinion by virtually all of the Germans who fought 
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over 2,000 in 2nd Tactical Air Force, specifically 
dedicated to OVERLORD. Now, having amassed 
such a vast armada, what should be done with 
it? Bomb German defensive positions right along 
the front? Attack supply depots further in the 
rear? Try and shoot up columns on the move? 
All of the above? Which is more profitable? Which 
is more effective? Where should the emphasis 
go? This is the nub of the doctrinal question, and 
as one might expect, there was not unanimity. 
But first of all, this whole discussion poses an 
obvious question: just how fast was the response 
to army requests for air support? Significantly, 
after making the above sweeping accusation, 
Gooderson does not answer this question. In 
order to answer it, we need a quick overview of 
the air support doctrine of the time. 
The Background: 
Inter-Service Rivalry 
By 1944, British air support doctrine had gone through an extensive evolution. The war 
began in 1939 with some considerable enmity 
between the Army and the RAF, even by the 
normal standards of inter-service rivalry. Indeed, 
the Army (and the RN) had at various times tried 
to have the RAF dissolved and its assets divided 
between the two older services.9 For its part, the 
RAF had preached the new doctrine of strategic 
bombing, which the RAF's founders and early 
leaders believed would render the older services 
themselves obsolescent, if not entirely obsolete.10 
"The bomber will always get through," as the 
saying went. In this environment, not only did 
the RAF not allocate any significant amount of 
resources towards air support to armies in the 
field, but they did not think very much about that 
particular issue either.11 The result of all of this 
was a system of air support in France in 1940 
that was cumbersome, slow and ineffective - one 
of the contributing factors to the debacle at 
Dunkirk. 
While still convinced that strategic bombers 
would win the war, even the RAF's hierarchy 
realized that air support would have to be 
improved, and shortly after Dunkirk Air Marshal 
A.S. Barratt, who had been the commander of 
the RAF forces in France in 1940, was made 
commander of new command within the RAF -
Army Cooperation Command. And within this 
new command two officers, both also veterans 
of the recent disaster in France - Brigadier J.D. 
about this to have taken the time to pen a long 
memorandum to Lieutenant-General H.D.G. 
Crerar, the commander of First Canadian Army. 
The situation as it s tands at present makes it 
quite impossible to expect that there can be any 
heavy or effective air attacks within a matter of 
several hours, to say the least, which require 
resources beyond those within the capacity of 
the Tactical Group suppor t ing the Army 
concerned.5 
M a n n w a s e s p e c i a l l y d i s t u r b e d b y a 
p a r t i c u l a r a i r s u p p o r t r e q u e s t w h i c h h e ou t l i ned 
i n g r e a t de ta i l . I n t h e e n d , t h e RAF h a d dec l ined 
to fill it. M a n n c o n s i d e r e d t h i s u n a c c e p t a b l e . 
In my opinion, the action of the ground forces is 
sabotaged, rather than supported, by the present 
practice of the Tactical Group with whom we 
have been cooperating.6 
This issue of timeliness, or perhaps more 
accurately responsiveness - getting close support 
air attacks on target as quickly as possible after 
Army request - has dominated consideration of 
the tactical air support issue from the very start. 
It was the issue that drove the first British efforts 
to reform their air support system after the 
debacle at Dunkirk and it was the issue that was 
central to complaints from the Army about air 
support throughout the Overlord campaign, the 
most vociferous example being (then) Brigadier 
Mann's accusations. Indeed, the timeliness issue 
has dominated the historiography of the issue 
down to the present day. Many commentators 
have discussed it, in tones generally disapproving 
of the RAF.7 Most recently Ian Gooderson, in his 
analysis of Allied tactical air power, stated: 
The British system proved very successful In 
processing pre-planned air support strikes, but 
the more difficult test was how quickly air 
suppor t could be provided in response to 
impromptu requests from forward troops, 
where speed was vitally important. In this 
respect, both in Italy and in the early stages of 
the campaign in North-West Europe, the process 
was simply not fast enough.8 
Are such accusations fair or accurate? In 
large part this question comes down to doctrine. 
After all, just what is the best way to apply air 
power against an enemy army in the field? Think 
of it this way - in June 1944 the Western Allies 
had over 9,000 aircraft in their various tactical 
air forces, the British and Commonwealth with 
60 
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This the RAF stoutly resisted, and even while the 
new tactical air force idea was coming together 
in North Africa the bureaucra t i c turf war over 
command and control escalated all the way up 
to C h u r c h i l l h imse l f . 1 4 He p r o d u c e d a 
compromise slightly favourable to the RAF. 
Contrary to the Air Staffs original wishes , a 
considerable port ion of the RAF's resources 
would be devoted specifically to army support in 
the tactical air forces. But against the Army's 
demand, these air forces ea rmarked for army 
suppor t would remain a par t of the RAF, unde r 
so le RAF c o m m a n d . The Army a n d RAF 
remained separa te services, and they operated 
u n d e r s e p a r a t e c o m m a n d e r s , even i n t h e 
f u r t h e r a n c e o f o n e c o m b i n e d p l a n . As 
contemporary doctrine p u t it: 
The Army Commander tells the Air Force 
Commander what he wants to achieve, and the 
Air Staff, having examined the problem, make 
Air plans with the Army's aim constantly in 
view.15 
Under this system, headquarters were paired 
at e a c h level of c o m m a n d . For O p e r a t i o n 
Overlord, 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF) itself was 
in suppor t of Montgomery's 21s t Army Group, 
and both of these formations had a headquarters 
which were deemed to be co-equal. At the next 
level down, 83 Group and 84 Group were to be 
61 
Woodall of the Army and Group Captain A. Wann 
of the RAF - were sent to the quiet backwater of 
Northern Ireland to jointly s tudy the problem of 
air suppor t to armies and propose solutions.1 2 
This they did, producing what came to be known 
as the "Wann/Woodall Report." The key feature 
of the Wann/Woodall recommendations was the 
creation of an elaborate system of radio links, to 
allow the rapid passage of air suppor t requests 
via a special communicat ions network, outside 
of the normal chain of command. This report 
formed the bas is for wha t became British and 
Commonweal th doctrine for air suppor t . After 
s o m e e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n , t he Wann /Wooda l l 
approach was exported to North Africa, where 
some independent developments had been made 
in the field. Together, t hese two s t a n d s of 
development gave rise to what became known as 
"Tactical Air Forces," the first s u c h tactical air 
force being the famous Desert Air Force or 
"DAF."13 
A Compromise: "Joint Command" 
Notwithstanding the progress being made at the operational and tactical levels, fierce 
Army/RAF disputes over command and control 
of air forces continued. The Army was keen to 
have air forces for ground support organic to their 
own service, or at least unde r Army command. 
A Spitfire of 2nd Tactical Air Force is loaded with a 500-pound bomb in 
preparation for a dive-bombing attack on the invasion coast. 
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A Canadian Group Captain looks at the offensive punch of the Hawker Typhoon - its Rocket Projectiles. 
was defined as "attacks on objectives which do 
not have an immediate effect on the land battle, 
but nevertheless contribute to the broad plan."18 
Typically that involved attacking enemy lines of 
communication, shipping, bases, rail targets and 
the like by heavy or medium bombers, but fighter-
bombers were used against such targets as well. 
Direct support, on the other hand, was defined 
as "attacks upon enemy forces actually engaged 
in the land battle."19 Typical targets included 
defensive positions, hostile batteries of artillery 
or concentrations of armour. "Direct Support" is 
thus generally analogous - but not identical - to 
the modern term "close air support," which did 
not appear in the official British terminology of 
1944. When targets such as panzers or artillery 
concentrating just to the rear were discovered, 
air strikes on these targets could be requested, 
and this was considered "direct support." Direct 
support was thus a slightly broader term than 
the modern close air support. It included not just 
close support, but also that air power applied 
behind the lines, but still within the immediate 
battle area.20 The most common means of 
dispatching such direct support into the German 
rear was by means of a mission known as "armed 
reconnaissance." 
Armed reconnaissance, or "armed recce" as 
it was commonly known, was a mission type in 
which a unit of fighter-bombers patrolled a given 
in support of Second British and First Canadian 
Armies respectively. This arrangement is 
important , because the principle of joint 
command meant that contrary to the Army's 
wishes, at no level could Army commanders 
order air support. Air forces were never under 
the command of Army commanders; both 
services remained under their own, completely 
separate, chains of command. In fact, the lowest 
level at which the two chains of command met 
was in the person of the Supreme Commander 
himself, General Dwight Eisenhower.16 As 
Brigadier Mann's accusations make clear, this 
was a contentious issue. 
The System in Normandy 
By the time of the Normandy campaign, British doctrine for a rmy/a i r operations had 
matured considerably. Drawing upon the 
development process begun by the Warm/Woodall 
report and the experience of the DAF, two 
authoritative pamphlets were released in early 
1944: Army/Air Operations: Pamphlet No. 1 -
General Principles and Organization, and Army I 
Air Operations Pamphlet No. 2 - Direct 
Support." 
This doctr ine d is t inguished between 
"indirect" and "direct" support. Indirect support 
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Impromptu Request Procedure 
Since all of these elements were tied together on a single radio network specially dedicated 
to air support requests, information could be 
passed about quickly. The intent was to allow 
the forward outstations, often with divisional or 
even brigade headquarters, to pass air requests 
directly back to Group/Army headquarters, 
without passing through the intermediate 
divisional and corps levels of command. The 
Army/Composite Group joint air staff could then 
either authorize or deny the request.26 If a forward 
controller was present with a cabrank overhead, 
air strikes could be ordered in without reference 
back to the Army/Compos i t e Group 
headquarters. (See Box on next page.) 
Consideration 
So, let us return to the question we started with. Jus t how responsive was RAF air 
support in Normandy? As we have seen, response 
time varied widely, and depended in large part 
on what type of request was being made. 
Pre-arranged support for major offensives were 
planned well in advance through the normal 
command channels. 
"Routine" pre-arranged missions were generally 
set out the evening before, usually based on 
planning and requests through the normal 
command channels. 
Impromptu requests varied depending on the 
priority of the reques t ing Army uni t and 
circumstances. In the general run of things, an 
impromptu request for fighter-bomber support 
from a standard tentacle took from one to two 
hours to fill - if it was decided to fill it.27 
If a VCP or FCP was forward, and a CABRANK 
was overhead, the response could be within 
minutes. 
It is not clear that this is such a poor 
performance. Indeed, in the case of cabranks with 
a forward controller, response from the air could 
be faster than the guns. Admittedly, cabranks 
were the exception rather than the rule, but 
cabranks were an extremely costly means of 
employing air power.28 In most cases a cabrank 
consisted of between four and 12 Typhoons. 
Given loiter time, flying time, reloading and 
refuelling time, to keep just one cabrank filled 
generally required an entire wing (three 
63 
a route or area behind German lines. They would 
range over this area, collecting valuable 
intelligence and at tacking any targets of 
opportunity, with bombs, rockets or guns.21 This 
was the mission type that led to so many shot-
up German columns on the Norman roads, and 
it came to be perhaps the most important - and 
contentious - mission type of the campaign. 
Direct support was further categorized on the 
basis of urgency, distinction being made between 
"impromptu" and "pre-arranged" requests for air 
support.22 Pre-arranged attacks were planned 
through the dedicated staff process, sometimes 
weeks ahead of time, but routinely for the next 
day. Impromptu requests were originated in the 
heat of battle by leading Army elements and 
forwarded via the special air request radio 
network first envisioned in the Wann/Woodall 
report. 
Perhaps the most famous means of providing 
air support was "cabrank," a system of close 
support in which a package of fighter-bombers, 
normally four Typhoons but sometimes an entire 
squadron, circled a specific point just behind the 
front, available to swoop down upon a target as 
soon as a forward controller called for support.23 
If the ground troops were advancing, the cabrank 
could advance with them. This procedure was 
immensely popular with the Army, perhaps 
because the circling aircraft were so reassuringly 
visible to friendly troops, but also because it 
meant that air support was available literally 
within minutes. 
Pre-arranged air support 
The centre of the process for planning pre-arranged air support was the air conference 
at Army/Group headquarters, which was meant 
to be held every evening but which in practice 
usually met only approximately every other day.24 
These were quite large affairs, often attended by 
some 20 staff officers and chaired by the Army 
headquarters Chief of Staff. This conference 
would discuss the s i tuat ion and routine 
operations for the next day and after the 
conference executive orders for the flying wings 
would be issued by the Group headquarters, 
usually by teleprinter. Additionally, specific 
conferences would be called as necessary to 
p roduce "Air Programmes" for major 
operations.25 
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The Forward Control 
of Air Support 
the corps headquarters deemed to 
be the priority for air support.6 FCPs 
were much larger than all other 
types of Forward tentacles, generally 
consisting of 10 personnel all ranks, 
mounted in at least two primary 
vehicles, either heavy trucks or M14 
half-tracked vehicles, plus usually a 
trailer and a jeep.7 The FCP's were 
equipped wi th b o t h a rmy type 
radios for the air support request 
net, and TR.1143 VHF radios to 
speak with aircraft.8 Unlike the 
ordinary tentacles, with their VHF 
radio an FCP could talk directly with 
overhead aircraft, for a range of 
about 30 to 40 kilometres." 
VCP 
Visual Control Posts or VCPs were an innovation introduced part 
way t h r o u g h t h e N o r m a n d y 
campa ign , t h e first one be ing 
employed in Operation "Goodwood" 
on 18 July. Essentially a s tandard 
tentacle augmented by a fighter-
bomber pilot with a VHF radio for 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n wi th ove rhead 
aircraft, as the name implies they 
were meant for directing air strikes 
onto targets under the VCP's direct 
observation. There were three VCPs 
in each Army/Composite Group,10 
b u t t hey were n o t en t i r e ly 
successful, apparently because in 
wireless sets, which gave them an 
effective r a n g e of a b o u t 40 
kilometres.4 This allowed them to 
"net in" to the special air support 
radio network and pass back air 
suppor t requests directly to the 
Joint Battle Room at Army/Group 
headquar t e r s . Coming from the 
artillery, the tentacle officers were 
specialists in fire support and could 
advise the local ground commander 
on the employment of air support. 
However, the pr imary task of a 
normal tentacle was to pass air 
requests from the leading divisional 
and brigade headquarters directly 
back to the joint Army/Composite 
Group headquarters via the ASSU 
net.6 S tandard tentacles did not 
have a n y r a d i o s t h a t cou ld 
communicate with aircraft. 
FCP 
Each Army/Composite Group had one Forward Control Post or 
FCP. There was only one within each 
Group/Army, and it was deployed to 
How were impromptu air strikes actually called onto targets? 
They were requested by the various 
independent wireless detachments 
with Hie leading Army headquarters. 
These were commonly known as 
"tentacles," since this was what they 
so resembled on the radio network 
organization charts .1 There were 
various sor ts of tentacles , with 
v a r y i n g c o n f i g u r a t i o n a n d 
equipment. These were modified 
somewhat over the course of the 
campaign, but generally they were 
organized along the following lines. 
"Standard" Tentacles 
Th e s e d e t a c h m e n t s were commanded by an arti l lery 
subaltern,2 and they were crewed by 
t h r e e Royal C o r p s of S i g n a l s 
s o l d i e r s , who o p e r a t e d a n d 
mainta ined the radios, and one 
d r ive r m e c h a n i c . 3 Normal ly 
mounted in a fifteen hundredweight 
signals truck, they were equipped 
with two "Canadian Number 9" type 
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practice they were seldom able to 
adopt posi t ions t ha t gave good 
o b s e r v a t i o n of t a r g e t s . 1 1 In 
consequence, VCPs came to be 
employed as de facto miniature 
FCPs, normal ly s i ted with the 
headquarters of leading divisions or 
brigades.12 VCPs consisted of a tank 
or White Scout car rigged with the 
required radio sets, and a total of 
five personnel all ranks.1 3 
Notes 
1. Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, p.265. 
2. There is some confusion about this. 
Originally, Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) 
were used, but according to Bidwell and 
Graham, this was discontinued in early 
1944, Firepower, p.266. However, the 
memo "Organization and Employment of 
1 Canadian ASSU" 8 March 1944, NAC 
RG 24 Vol. 10671 file 215C1.093(D2) 
states that there were officers in every 
tentacle, but that artillery subalterns (ie. 
lieutenants) rather than actual ALOs were 
used. 
3. Air Support and Air Recce, Ch.4, para 4. 
4. Ibid,, Ch.2 p.4. For information on the 
Canadian No.9 radio set, see Wireless for 
the Warrior Volume 1, a history of Second 
World War military radios held at the 
; : Communications and Electronics Branch 
museum in Kingston, ON. 
5. Army/Air Operations (1) General 
Principles and Organization, p.22. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Memo "Forward Aids to Air Support", 1 
September 1944, NAC RG 24 Vol 10671 
file 215C 1.093. 
8. Memo, "Report by CSO [Chief Signals 
Officer] 83 Group on the Operation of 
Signals During 1944", February 1945, 
PRO AIR 37/333. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Some sources state that there was only 
one VCP per Army/ Composite Group. 
However, AIR 37/333 "Report by CSO 
83 Group," states that there were three. 
Also, various air programmes, for 
instance for Op Totalize, include tasks 
for more than one VCP {see "Op 
TOTALIZE - AIR PROGRAMME" 6 
August 1944, NAC RG 24 Vol 10671 file 
215C1.096(D3)). 
11. Main Headquarters 21st Army Group, 
"Notes on Air Support June-October 
1944" November 1944, PRO WO 205/ 
556, p.5. 
12. There is a certain amount of confusion 
about this. Gooderson, Air Power at the 
Battlefront, p.27, states that experience 
in Normandy showed VCPs could 
seldom exercise visual control over air 
strikes and so "were modified to become 
small forward air-support controls. 
They became known as. . .FCPs." 
However, FCPs were larger than VCPs, 
and It seems clear that FCPs were 
developed before VCPs. Apparently, 
what happened is not that VCPs became 
FCPs, bu t that VCPs came to be 
employed as de facto miniature FCPs. 
For detai ls on VCP and FCP 
organization and equipment, see: HQ 
2nd TAF Memo "Forward Direction of 
Aircraft" 16 September 1944, PRO AIR 
2/7870, para 6; Main Headquarters 21st 
Army Group, "Notes on Air Support 
June-October 1944" November 1944, 
PRO WO 205/556; and Air Support and 
Air Recce, Chapter 4. 
13. Memo "Forward Aids to Air Support" 1 
September 1944, NAC RG 24 Vol 10671 
file 215C1.093. 
Flying control personnel of a Canadian Spitfire 
Wing stand outside their radio control truck. 
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centralized for concerted blows, rather than 
"penny packeted out" to every army formation 
along the length of the front. Thus, the RAF 
preferred not to farm out all of their resources 
to a cabrank for every division or corps. 
Furthermore, it has to be asked, why would 
an Army suddenly need air support of a weight 
"beyond...the capacity of the Tactical Group 
supporting the Army concerned," as Mann put 
it31? Presumably only in the event of an 
unexpected, very large scale, enemy offensive 
manoeuvre, or conversely some sudden and 
unexpected enemy collapse that they wished to 
capitalize upon. Does that really describe the 
requests Brigadier Mann was complaining about? 
The fact is, that on those occasions when there 
really was such a sudden great need, 2nd TAF's 
resources were indeed quickly concentrated - for 
instance during the German counteroffensive 
around Mortain, or during the battle to close the 
Falaise gap. Finally, once again it must be stressed 
that if it really was important to have air support 
more quickly, a cabrank would be laid on. 
The debate, then, really hinges on the issue 
of the desired function for tactical air power. Was 
it meant to be, in essence, additional fire support 
for the forward troops, a supplement to the 
artillery? In that case timeliness of response 
would be critical. Or was it meant to deny the 
squadrons) of Typhoons. There were only six 
Typhoon wings in all of 2nd TAF. So cabranks 
were reserved for when they were really needed 
- those comparat ively ra re cases when 
immediate close support really was essential.29 
It was used sparingly, but it was available when 
necessary. 
So what can be said about the Army 
criticisms of Air Force responsiveness? It would 
be tempting to conclude straight off that these 
Army/RAF problems were a hangover from the 
prewar inter-service rivalry which had thoroughly 
poisoned relations between the two services. At 
the time, this was certainly the view of the Army 
in general and Brigadier Mann in particular. Since 
then, many historians have maintained that the 
pr imary motive behind the alleged RAF 
intransigence was fear of coming under Army 
domination, and desire to stress the RAF's 
independence.30 
Surely, this view is too simple. It is difficult 
at best to peer into the minds of men long dead 
and discern their personal motives. Whatever 
those motives may have been, personal 
acrimonies should not be allowed to obscure the 
fact that there was a substantive intellectual 
dispute. Reflecting a theme that stretched at least 
back to the 1930s, the RAF was genuinely 
concerned to ensure that its air power was 
66 
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss2/5
The temptation to abuse the flexibility of air 
power by attacking targets that may appear to 
be favourable, but which in fact are not vital to 
the battle, must be resisted; otherwise the forces 
available may be dissipated and not used to the 
best advantage of the operation as a whole. The 
maximum effort must be concentrated at the 
decisive place.33 
What i s p e r h a p s su rp r i s ing i s t h a t th i s 
doctrine h a d been produced, not by the RAF or 
the Air Ministry, b u t by the War Office.34 In fact, 
the principal au thor and editor of the above two 
quotations was an Army officer.35 
The Flip Side: RAF Shortcomings 
It is all very well to say that air power should be concentrated in some decisive way - the RAF's 
explanation for tu rn ing down Army reques t s . 
What actual targets should be at tacked to effect 
s u c h decisive concentrat ion? This was a key 
problem. As we have seen, under the doctrine of 
joint command "the Army Commander tells the 
Air Force Commander what he wants to achieve, 
and the Air Staff, having examined the problem, 
make Air p lans with the Army's aim constant ly 
Germans freedom of manoeuvre and subject 
them to a grim attrit ional bat t le? Alternatively, 
the doctrinal intent could have been to d is rupt 
higher level German p lans and intent ions. In 
e i ther of the lat ter two cases , t imel iness of 
response would be far less critical; indeed, in 
those cases the priority of effort would be far 
behind the German lines. 
RAF Doctrinal Intent 
Not surprisingly, given RAF at t i tudes , air suppor t doctrine in 1944, s u c h as i t was, 
s t r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f c e n t r a l a n d 
independent control of air power, so as to be able 
to strike at the decisive points. The key doctrinal 
m a n u a l of the time, Army/Air Operations (1) 
General Principles and Organization, s ta ted: 
The air effort will be concentrated on a vital 
target at the decisive point. The tendency to 
fritter away the effort on relatively unimportant 
targets must be sternly resisted.32 
In the same vein, Army/Air Operations (2) 
Direct Support added: 
Flying Officer Arthur Vincent 
examines the damage to his Typhoon 
after returning from an attack on a 
railway bridge near Rouen. 
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Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, Commander of 2nd Tactical Air Force addresses his men in Normandy. 
i n view."36 T h e Br i t i sh Army ' s i m m e d i a t e p o s t w a r 
ana lys i s o f a i r s u p p o r t c o n t a i n s s o m e par t i cu la r ly 
bitter words about this approach. 
The theory that the army should confine itself 
to stating the problem in general terms, and the 
air forces should then decide the method in all 
its detail has proved quite impracticable when 
applied literally in combined operations.37 
In s u p p o r t o f t h i s , t h e r e p o r t goes on to p o i n t 
ou t : 
It is educative to realise that, in this campaign, 
out of every hundred attacks carried out from 
the air by the tactical air forces, it is estimated 
that at least ninety five have been on targets 
selected, named and annotated by the army 
alone, including in many cases the provision of 
the actual aiming points. With the exception of 
those targets directly related to the enemy air 
forces, it has been the army almost exclusively 
which has produced the targets, and which has 
been the principal contributor to the preparation 
of the air plan in direct support of a particular 
battle.38 
This is almost certainly a fair criticism, for 
the RAF system did not in fact include much 
provision for targeting. Targets were expected to 
come from either the daily planning conferences 
- where it would be the Army that raised them -
or up through the air support request net, which 
would also be, therefore, from the Army. Second 
TAF lacked the necessary staff to select any actual 
targets for attack other than through those two 
mechanisms. More critically, the RAF overall 
lacked the expertise and the doctrine for target 
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selection in a land campaign.39 After all, just what 
are the best targets to attack with air power -
especially given the technical limitations of the 
time - when one wants to, for instance, ensure 
that "enemy road movements...[are] continually 
harassed."40 Bridges? Road choke points in 
villages? Columns on the move? 
The basic air support doctrine of the time 
had little to say about this. Quite simply, the 
doctrine of the time had not thought these issues 
through. If the RAF wanted to maintain that air 
officers were the sole experts on the application 
of air power, then reasonably they should have 
addressed the targeting issue rigorously. 
Concentration? 
Another issue that the RAF must answer for Is its actual efforts to concentrate their air 
power. Having nailed their colours to the mast of 
"concentrating air power" as the reason for 
turning down Army requests, just how effectively 
did they concentrate their air power? 
With the exception of major offensives, the 
close support effort was not part icularly 
focused, being driven from the "bottom-up," 
rather than the "top-down" (i.e. requests were 
initiated by forward troops, either through air 
support radio network for impromptu missions 
or up the Army cha in-of -command for 
consideration at the daily air conference for pre-
arranged missions). 
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As we have seen, that would have been to ignore 
the issue of concentration of force. In fact, in 
doctrine and policy statements the Army did 
officially acknowledge that air power should be 
concentrated. Some Army commanders appear 
to have had false expectations about air support, 
and to a certain extent these false expectations 
have become conventional wisdom. 
The nub of the issue is that the only way to 
make the air support more responsive to every 
Army request from the front would have been to 
allocate a greater weight of effort to cabranks -
at the expense of other mission types. Inevitably, 
that would have dispersed the air effort, 
concentrating it nowhere. It is not clear that 
overall this would have been more effective. It is 
clear, on the other hand, that at those times when 
it was considered important to concentrate air 
power for direct intervention in the land battle -
for major offensives, around Mortain, and during 
the closing of the Falaise gap - 2nd TAF's effort 
was devoted whole-heartedly to direct support. 
All of this touches upon what is perhaps the 
central historical debate of the Normandy 
campaign - the performance of the Allied armies, 
in particular at the operational level. Many 
historians have been sharply critical of the Allied 
commanders handling of the campaign.45 What 
a p p e a r s to have h a p p e n e d is t h a t as 
breakthrough attempt followed breakthrough 
attempt - without success - the Army became 
ever more dependent upon firepower to batter 
their way forward. This propensity later led Air 
Marshal Arthur Tedder to wryly observe: "The 
Army having been drugged with bombs, it is going 
to be a difficult process to cure the drug 
addicts."46 The Army commanders also became 
increasingly fixated upon the tactical level of the 
fighting, losing their sense of the operational art. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the air support they 
called for was narrow in nature, tending towards 
a desire for on-call tactical help everywhere, with 
massive heavy bomber strikes to precede any 
advance. 
To be fair to the Army critics, however, it is 
equally clear that the RAF was not properly 
prepared for fighting a land campaign. They 
lacked the expertise and machinery for effective 
targeting, and by default this central function fell 
into the Army's lap. This while the RAF was 
stoutly maintaining that only air officers were 
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A perception of unfocused effort is furthered 
by the means used to direct the armed recces, 
which was the mission type that consumed the 
most sorties.41 Armed recces appear to have been 
allocated largely on a simple geographic basis. 
Headquarters 21st Army Group and 2nd TAF 
designated areas for armed recce coverage to each 
Composite Group, and these areas were further 
sub-divided and allotted to Wings by the 
respective Group Control Centre (GCC).42 At the 
time the RAF considered this an effective system 
because air reconnaissance information arrived 
at the GCCs first, and could therefore be used 
immediately to direct the armed recce effort.43 
This is doubtless true, but the larger issue is that 
since the GCCs were purely RAF organizations 
dedicated to air control (as opposed to the Joint 
Battle Room formed at the Army/Group co-
located headquarters), the distribution of armed 
recces was in fact being determined by RAF 
planners in isolation from the Army. Presumably 
they simply directed armed recces to what were 
thought to be the most fertile hunting grounds 
within the assigned area. Most critically, there 
was no mechanism to concentrate armed recces 
in areas that would complement and enhance the 
overall Allied scheme of manoeuvre or campaign 
plan. It appears that armed recces were largely 
shotgunned out on the basis of aircraft availability 
and what were perceived to be fertile hunting 
grounds within arbitrary geographic areas that 
had been designated not to concentrate 2nd TAF's 
tactical air power, but primarily as a de-
confliction control measure.44 
Conclusion 
It is very clear that the system developed to control air support, whatever its doctrinal 
origins, was a technical marvel. It could indeed 
rapidly concentrate air power against the enemy, 
as demonstrated around Mortain and the mouth 
of the Falaise gap. Furthermore, it did include 
specific provisions for getting air support onto 
targets within moments of request - the cabrank 
system. 
So what are we to make of the criticisms from 
some quarters of the Army camp that air support 
was intransigent, or at least unresponsive? Such 
criticisms seem to come down to the complaint 
that 2nd TAF would not delegate on-call fighter-
bombers to every local commander along the 
front who wanted them, as they wanted them. 
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expert in the application of air power. As a result, 
2nd TAF's efforts throughout the campaign were 
not as focused as they perhaps could have been. 
Why did this happen, when the air support 
doctrine of the time stressed concentration and 
even included prescient warnings against "the 
temptation to abuse the flexibility of air power" 
by "frittering away the effort on relatively 
unimportant targets." It seems that in the heat 
of battle - and clash of personalities between key 
commanders - practice ran away from doctrine. 
Arguably this reflected the difficulty of the 
moment, and the inherent limitations of the 
doctrine in the first place. Certainly the Army 
critics would view it that way. 
However, air support doctrine was not really 
fully developed. Because of the all-consuming 
Army/RAF arguments over air power and 
strategic bombing, neither side gave much 
serious thought to applying air power in a land 
campaign. When it was finally decided, very late 
in the day, to form tactical air forces for just this 
role, all of the available energy was consumed by 
frantic efforts to knit together a working 
organization and solve the immediate practical 
problems. In this an extraordinary success was 
achieved, but little time or energy was left over 
for contemplation of the more subtle - and 
difficult - doctrinal questions, such as where to 
concentrate the air effort and how to effect the 
actual targeting. Doubtless too, this doctrinal 
failure on the RAF's part reflected the larger 
doctrinal failure of the Allied forces at the 
operational level. 
Nevertheless, the campaign was in the end 
successful for the Western Allies. Given the near-
run nature of that success, all of the Allied 
contributions were critical. Second TAF did 
succeed in helping defeat the German armies in 
the West. Although its doctrinal limitations made 
it a somewhat blunt instrument, it was a powerful 
one. 
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